In Part 1 I addressed some issues with Deem’s rendition of the cosmological argument. He happens to have an entire page dedicated to it, so it bears deeper examination, especially since it’s such a popular one.
From Genesis 1:1 “In the beginning, God created the heavens and the earth” Deem asserts God acted before time when he created the universe. This is a stretch: if God was acting in the beginning, as Genesis says, he’d be acting in time, not before the beginning. He does provide four other verses that explicitly state God acted before time began, so we can still work forward from the claim, ignoring Genesis for now.
Deem asserts because God exists outside of time, cause and effect do not apply. Whether he considers God an uncaused cause is somewhat unclear as a result, but let’s assume God is a cause but does not require a cause. This atemporal God of the standard cosmological argument runs into a standard problem: there’s no reason to think it’s unique.
Deem proposes alternatively that God exists in multiple dimensions of time and can move freely about them. In this case time is prior to God, and time is left as a necessary being, thus either part of God, leaving us with the previous case, or else being a necessary being is not unique, leaving us with the same problem as above. Let us ignore this case, then, as it resolves to the previous case.
If beings can necessarily exist, such as God, we have no initial reason to suspect only one does. In this case, monotheism is at best a guess. More egregiously, the universe itself could be a necessary being (space and time themselves could be necessary with matter and energy properties thereof). In this case no god is needed.
The argument Deem presents again attempts to conclude God from the finite time of the universe. He ignores other possibilities as he has already arrived at the conclusion of God, only looking back to draw a map that could lead to God, but could also lead to any other conclusion involving a necessary being.